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APPLYING STRICT LIABILITY TO DEFECTIVE
PRODUCTS LITIGATION IN WEST VIRGINIA
WITH EXPLANATORY EMPHASIS UPON COAL
MINING MACHINERY CASES
RICHARD E. RowE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The historic oppression of the Appalachian coal miner gave
rise to the militant unionism of the 1920's. In response to this labor
movement, coal operators endeavored to cut labor costs and boost
production. This move to retrench was aided by the advent of
workmen's compensation which totally insulated the subscribing
mine operator from damages for the frequent injuries and deaths.'
As a consequence, when machinery was developed for the mines,
production was the main objective and safety was only a remote
consideration. A review of the development of products liability
law as it relates to mining machinery demonstrates this lack of
concern.
The single largest cause of accidents in the coal fields is the
roof fall.2 In the past, miners used posts to support the roof, but
with the progress of technology a machine has been developed
which drills a hole in the roof and inserts bolts with either glue or
an expander bolt on the end to anchor them. This permits the roof
* B.S.B.A. West Virginia University 1966; J.D. West Virginia University,
1969; Partner, Goodwin & Goodwin, Charleston, W.Va. I wish to acknowledge the
abundant knowledge and experience gained in products liability cases while prac-
ticing with Clark Frame, Morgantown, W.Va., which formed the basis for much of
this article.
' W. VA. CODE §§ 23-2-6,-6a (1978 Replacement Vol.) and § 23-4-2 (1978 Re-
placement Vol.) provide immunity from suit for the employer so long as the injury
is not inflicted with deliberate intention. This had been generally interpreted to
mean complete immunity, since no case had permitted recovery. However, in
Mandolidis v. Elkins Indus., Inc., 246 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1978), the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals held that while deliberate intention excluded negligent
conduct on the part of the employer, an employee could sue his employer if the
death or injury was caused by wilful, wanton or reckless misconduct.
2 Roof falls have, on the average, accounted for over 50% of the underground
fatalities, according to Herschel Potter, Chief, Division of Safety, Office of Coal
Mine Health and Safety. Proposed Regulation Concerning the Federal Coal Mine
Health and Safety Act of 1969: Public Hearing on Section 317(J) Before John W.
Crawford, Assistant Director of Coal Mine Health and Safety, Bureau of Mines 6
(July 31, 1972 at House of Delegates Chambers, State Capitol, Charleston, W. Va.)
[hereinafter cited as Public Hearing on Section 317(J)].
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to support itself and, therefore, allows better movement in the
mine. The early roof bolters were designed with no provision for
temporary roof support and thus the operator had to work under
an unsupported roof while drilling the hole and inserting the bolt.'
Later, design concepts such as dual or remote controls were
adopted from other machines. Temporary hydraulic jacks and can-
opies were installed for temporary roof support. While the devices
did make the cycle time for placing a bolt a bit longer, they saved
many lives and prevented uncounted severe injuries.4 However, as
a general rule, the development of mine safety equipment has been
a sporadic and peripheral concern at best.
The haphazard evolution of safety devices is evidenced by one
manufacturer's advertisement of the hydraulic safety jack as a new
safety device shortly after being sued for their failure to provide
that feature.5 A review of this company's literature in years follow-
ing4he lawsuit also revealed the repeated use of the words "safety
features" in describing components of their machines. Some items
originally touted as production features were later called safety
features.
The design and development of most coal mining machinery
appears to have been accomplished by persons without the profes-
An early case decided in favor of a defendant foof bolt manufacturer was
Whitacre v. Wilcox Manufacturing Co., No. C-69-19F (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 25, 1972).
The plaintiff asserted the absence of safety features such as dual controls, hydraulic
safety post and on-off listen button and also contended that the machine's design
required the operator to work in the area of greatest danger, the drilling head,
without a protective roof.
' Mr. Potter predicted a 38.5% reduction in underground fatalities with this
use of protective canopies or cabs. Public Hearing on Section 317(J), supra note 2,
at 8. Mr. John McCormick, of the Pittsburgh Health and Technical Support Cen-
ter, stated that surveys had been done at mines with cabs or canopies and that it
was a general consensus of both the operators and miners that the cabs and cano-
pies definitely improved safety. Id. at 11.
See Gallatin v. Fletcher Mfg. Co., No. 6935 (Monongalia County Cir. Ct.
April 15, 1974) (order dismissing suit with prejudice following out of court settle-
ment by the parties).
' Literature searches of advertisements in industry magazines and company
publications are rewarding because one may trace the technological development
of these machines. Engineering principles from other types of machinery are applic.
able to the mechanics of coal mining machinery, and experts can use these to
determine how the machinery could have been built more safely. Patent searches
on mechanical devices are also helpful to illustrate that many safety devices were
technologically feasible long before the manufacturers chose to incorporate them in
their products.
[Vol. 82
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sional competence one would expect. It is not unusual to find engi-
neering departments of mining machinery manufacturers which do
not employ graduate engineers. The copying of other companies'
designs is prevalent in the industry, as is an all too common failure
to follow sound engineering principles applicable to moving machi-
nery. It is not surprising, therefore, that mechanical engineers are
most useful in exposing this ineptitude in a products liabilit case.
7
Further fault may be found in the machinery designers' lack of
safety training and knowledge of safety principles. Manufacturers
of mining machinery have yet to reach the sophistication found in
other industries and therefore, the trial lawyers representing in-
jured miners continue to discover myriad product flaws justifying
products liability actions. Even though the equipment in coal
mines is specially designed, there are many similarities between it
and equipment used in other industries. Therefore, as a general
rule, the "state of the art" defense8 which is often employed in
products liability cases cannot be used as effectively in mining
machinery cases.
Using mining machinery as its keystone, this article explores
the application of strict liability to products liability situations.
The article also touches upon other issues that will continue to be
litigated in products liability cases subsequent to the adoption of
strict liability. Section II examines the adoption of strict liability
in products cases. The class protected and those who are to be
liable in mining machinery and other products cases will be exam-
ined in Section III. The defenses of contributory negligence and
assumption of the risk will be explored in Section IV. The applica-
ble statute of limitations is scrutinized in Section V, and whether
changes in the product may be admissible in evidence is discussed
in Section VI.
I. THE ADOPTION OF STmcr LIABILITY
The West Virginia coal miner, worker, and consumer were
welcomed into the age of strict liability in 1979 by Morningstar v.
I Engineering departments of universities seem to be the best source of experts
because they are generally not related to the coal industry and can be more objec-
tive.
" The "state of the art" defense is roughly based upon the proposition that the
particular manufacturer's product is as advanced as human skill and knowledge
will allow any similar product to be. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 99 (4th ed. 1971).
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Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.' Justice Miller, in a splendid
opinion, traced the evolution of strict liability in tort in the United
States and in West Virginia and concluded that "Once it can be
shown that the product was defective when it left the manufac-
turer and that the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury,
a recovery is warranted absent some conduct on the part of the
plaintiff that may bar his recovery."'"
[T]he general test for establishing strict liability in tort is
whether the involved product is defective in the sense that it is
not reasonably safe for its intended use. The standard of reason-
able safeness is determined not by the particular manufacturer,
but by what a reasonably prudent manufacturer's standards
should have been at the time the product was made."
In adopting the original rule of Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products Inc.,"2 rather than the more restrictive and later rule
9 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979).
.o Id. at 680.
" Id. at 683. The court gave guidance for setting these standards in footnote
20 of the opinion when it quoted from the risk/utility analysis enunciated in Cepeda
u. Cumberland Eng'r Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978). This analysis gives
seven factors to be weighed in determining whether a product is defective:
1. The usefulness and desirability of the product - its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
2. The safety aspects of the product - the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
3. The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
4. The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
5. The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
6. The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the prod-
uct and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of the
obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings
or instructions.
7. The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the loss
by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
253 S.E.2d 666, 681 n.20 (W. Va. 1979).
12 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), (cited in Morningstar
v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 684 (W. Va. 1979)). The Greenman
rule is: "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the
market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have
a defect that causes injury to a human being." 59 Cal. 2d at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. at 700 (1963). This was followed by Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61
[Vol. 82
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announced by the Second Restatement of Torts,' 3 the court ob-
viated the necessity of proving that the product was unreasonably
dangerous. Proof of the defect thus became easier for the plaintiff,
and the standard of conduct which the manufacturers and sellers
of products must meet is more stringent.
Applying this distinction in a suit involving a battery powered
scoop which the miner operates in low coal by lying on his back
with his head and part of his back sticking beyond the frame of
the machine, the experts for the plaintiff said the location and
manner of operation of the controls created an unreasonable risk
of harm to the operator and that the operator's compartment and
controls were negligently designed." The defendants contended
that the design was safe because it allowed the operator freedom
to observe the working area and the controls were easily learned
and their functions obvious. To prevail in this type suit under the
Restatement rule, the plaintiff would have had to prove that the
design resulted in an "unreasonably dangerous condition." Many
cases, however, will find the jury and expert more comfortable with
the terms "not reasonably safe." Although the distinction may
seem more imagined than real, the application of the "not reason-
Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1968), which adopted privity-free, strict
tort liability against distributors.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A (1965). This section provides:
1. One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if:
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
2. The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation
and sale of the product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
The adoption of this rule by the American Law Institute codified the law of strict
liability but a compromise on its adoption added the requirement that the product
be unreasonably dangerous. "The article sold must be dangerous to an extent
beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteris-
tics." Id. at Comment i.
" Toler v. S & S Corp., No. C-75-7-F (N.D.W. Va. April 6, 1976) (order dis-
missing suit with prejudice following out of court settlement by the parties).
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ably safe" term may result in recovery for the plaintiff more often
than if he has to prove the machine was "unreasonably danger-
ous."
Although the causes of action founded upon express and im-
plied warranty as well as negligent manufacture and design are
still very much alive in West Virginia products liability law, the
road has been paved around many of the obstacles. The standard
imposed on a manufacturer or seller of goods in strict liability is
basically that the product must not be defective at the time it
leaves the defendant's possession if employed in the manner in
which it was intended to be used.'" However, if the plaintiff em-
ploys a theory of negligent design or defect, he is required to prove
that the defect was the result of the defendant's failure to exercise
due care. In addition, the defendant in such a negligence action
retains the defense of contributory negligence.'" In warranty, the
plaintiff must prove facts which establish an expressed or implied
warranty and the defendant has the defenses of lack of notice of
the breach, express disclaimer of the warranty,'" and contractual
assumption of the risk. The defense of lack of privity, formerly
available in West Virginia, has now been abrogated.'"
III. THE CLASS OF PERSONS PROTECTED AND THE CLASS OF
BusINEsSES LIABLE
From the opinion in Morningstar, it appears that the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is prepared to extend the
IS See Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1971).
The doctrine of comparative negligence, adopted by the West Virginia Su-
preme Court of Appeals in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879, (W.
Va. 1979), abolished the use of contributory negligence as an absolute defense. The
impact of this defense on products liability cases was greatly lessened, however, by
the adoption of strict liability in Morningstar.
,7 The legislature in 1976 adopted the Consumer Credit and Protection Act, W.
VA. CODE §§ 46A-6-101 to -8-102 (1978 Replacement Vol.). § 46A.6-107 prohibits a
disclaimer of warranties in consumer transactions. The problem with this is that
many products liability cases, especially cases arising in the coal industry, involve
transactions between coal companies and suppliers or manufacturers which may
not be labeled as consumer transactions.
,1 The largest hurdle in the path of strict liability in tort was cleared by the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Dawson v. Canteen Corp., 212 S.E.2d
82 (W. Va. 1975). This decision abolished both horizontal privity (chain of users)
and vertical privity (chain of distribution). The legislature also abolished privity,
W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-108 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
[Vol. 82
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theory of strict liability to sellers as well as manufacturers. 9 Cali-
fornia did this relatively soon after adopting the rule of
Greenman.2" The Second Restatement of Torts also adopted the
rule that the seller of a defective product is strictly liable in tort.2'
The logical extension of this doctrine would require that each link
in the distributive chain, such as wholesaler, jobber, or distributor,
be held strictly liable. 2 The effect of this on cases involving mining
machinery will be minimal since most manufacturers sell directly
to the coal companies and no middlemen are involved.
The West Virginia court has further obviated the need for
legislation to protect the retailer by recognizing that the seller or
wholesaler who sells the defective product may be indemnified by
the manufacturer if the seller or wholesaler does not contribute to
the defect.2
Another question which arises in charting the parameters of
the application of strict liability concerns the different classes of
persons to be protected. The plaintiff in Morningstar was the em-
ployee of the purchaser of the Black & Decker saw which injured
him. 21 Surely, adopting principles from warranty law, any lawful
consumer in the broadest sense of the term, including members of
the ultimate purchaser's family, his guests or lendee, will be pro-
tected in West Virginia. Despite the inapplicability of privity to
, Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683 n.22 (W. Va.
1979). The proposition is stated that the rule applies both to manufacturers and
sellers, and the court predicts it would allow indemnity from a manufacturer where
the seller does not contribute to the defect.
" See Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1968).
21 The Restatement defines the word "seller" as any person engaged in the
business of selling products for use or consumption. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTS § 402A, Comment f (1965).
2 Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Il. App. 2d 31, 229 N.E.2d
684 (1967), held the distributor of a claw hammer strictly liable. The RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF Toirrs § 402A, Comment f (1965), also defines seller as "any wholesale
or retail dealer or distributor." See also 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODuCrS LL4BIrrY
§§ 19A[1], 20.04[2] (1979) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN].
2 Seventeen states have recently enacted legislation which involves products
liability litigation. One area addressed is limitation of the liability of the retailer.
Some states' statutes bar the suit totally, while others protect the retailer only to
the extent that jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the manufacturer, and others
protect the seller if the product was sold in a sealed container. See 2 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 16-C [5].
21 Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 676 (W. Va. 1979).
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strict liability cases, those cases have served as precedents for the
extension of strict liability to additional classes of persons." This
matter was first addressed in West Virginia when the legislature
adopted the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The legislature
adopted the "neutral" alternative which defines the protected
class as "any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect
that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods
"28
The cases decided on the warranty theory, both before and
after the UCC, would only extend protection to members of the
purchaser's household. The late Judge Christie, when attempt-
ing to predict if the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
would extend protection to encompass individuals not in privity
nor in the class specified by section 318 of the UCC, concluded
that the West Virginia court would not further expand the pro-
tected class of persons to include these individuals.Y
A careful reading of the court's opinion in Morningstar, how-
ever, indicates they do not intend to be bound by these past restric-
tive warranty rules which deal with the class of persons who can
recover in strict liability cases. In reciting the law of strict liability
in West Virginia, the court cited cases which, under a negligence
theory, protected a user or consumer who had not purchased the
product, 2s a son of a purchaser,29 and an innocent bystander." Of
See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 16A[4][c].
2S W. VA. CODE § 46-2-318. Comment 3 states:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions the
family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the section
is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties given to his buyer who resells,
extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
7 Maynard v. General Elec. Co., 350 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.W. Va. 1972), affl'd,
486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973). Judge Christie had previously ruled that where a cause
of action was based on negligence, the employee of a purchaser could recover from
the manufacturer. Shanklin v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.W.
Va. 1966), affl'd, 383 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1967) (abstracted in 69 W. VA. L. REV. 106
(1966)).
I Peters v. Johnson, Jackson & Co., 50 W. Va. 644, 41 S.E. 190 (1902) (ac-
quaintance of plaintiff requests epsom, but is given saltpeter, which plaintiff con-
sumes, causing injury).
" Webb v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., 121 W. Va. 115, 2 S.E.2d 898
(1939).
30 Ferrell v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 144 W. Va. 465, 109 S.E.2d 489 (1959)
[Vol. 82
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course, Greenman3' was a case in which the husband of the pur-
chaser was the plaintiff. Other states have extended strict liability
to employees of purchasers," users or consumers," passengers, 3
and innocent bystanders.3 The Restatement does not take a posi-
tion on how far protection should be extended. 6
The extension of the class to innocent bystanders has met
some resistance .3 However, it seems more logical that this class of
persons should be entitled to greater protection than the user or
consumer who has the opportunity to inspect for defects and to
limit purchases and uses to products manufactured by reputable
manufacturers and sold by reputable dealers. The bystander ordi-
narily has no such option.
The extension of the doctrine of strict liability to users, em-
ployees and bystanders will have a significant impact on litigation
in coal machinery cases. While the operator of the machine is the
one most often hurt, others in the immediate vicinity are also
subject to great hazards. For instance, some of the mining machi-
nery is now equipped with a "panic bar" which allows the operator
to immediately disengage the machine in case of emergency. This
safety device protects not only the operator, but fellow employees
(shopper in a supermarket injured when a pop bottle she had placed in her basket
exploded).
11 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697.
32 See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970); Cintrone v. Hertz
Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965); Lonzrick v. Repub-
lic Steel Corp., 1 Ohio App. 2d 374, 205 N.E.2d 92 (1962), affl'd, 6 Ohio St. 2d 227,
218 N.E.2d 185 (1966). See also Shanklin v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 254 F. Supp.
223 (S.D.W. Va. 1966), affl'd, 383 F.2d 819 (4th Cir. 1967) (abstracted in 69 W. VA.
L. REv. 106 (1966)).
-" See, e.g., Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); McCor-
mack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 322, 154 N.W.2d 488 (1967); Ethicon v. Parten, 520
S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
11 See, e.g., Haley v. Merit Chevrolet, Inc., 67 Ill. App. 2d 19, 214 N.E.2d 347
(1966); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash. 2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
" See, e.g., Passwaters v. General Motors Corp., 454 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1972);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652
(1969).
11 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Comment o states that it
does not predict whether protection should be extended beyond the class of users
and consumers as defined by them. The class of protected persons would include a
remote purchaser, a donee of the purchaser - thus a user, a member of the pur-
chaser's family or his guest or his employee. See Id. at Comment i.
3 See 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 16A[4][c].
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who are in the area of danger. On a roof-bolter, this device can also
be characterized as a "stop and listen button" which allows the
operator to stop the machine to determine whether the roof is
adequately supported. This protects not only the workman, but all
people in the immediate area.3 Obviously, any machinery not so
equipped puts the bystander, as well as the operator, at risk.
IV. ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK AND COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
Although there had been a great deal of confusion on the issue
of whether contributory negligence and/or assumption of the risk
were defenses in products liability cases," Justice Miller, in
Morningstar, clearly pointed the way for West Virginia by holding
that contributory negligence in its traditional sense was not a de-
fense to strict liability, but that assumption of the risk would be.4"
Judge Haymond in Wright v. Valan4' discussed the difference
between contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Con-
tributory negligence is seen as the failure of the plaintiff to use due
care; in essence, it is the carelessness of the plaintiff. Judge Hay-
mond further stated that the essence of assumption'of the risk was
venturousness, which is a deliberate choice by the plaintiff. Justice
Berry added in Spurlin v. Nardo2 that knowledge and appreciation
of the danger are necessary elements of the defense of assumption
of the risk.
With the adoption of strict liability in tort, West Virginia
aligns itself with those states which follow the Restatement of
Torts' interpretation that "contributory negligence of the plaintiff
is not a defense when such negligence consists merely of the failure
to discover the defect in the product or to guard against the possi-
bility of its existence.
4 3
Is This use of this device illustrates the application of sound engineering princi-
ples to coal mining machinery. Panic bars and emergency cut-offs have been on
many types of machinery for years, but only recently have been used on mining
machinery.
3' See, e.g., 2 FRUMER & FRtEDMAN, supra note 22, § 16A[5][f]; Annot., 46
A.L.R.3d 240 (1972).
1* Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666, 683-84 (W. Va.
1979). Morningstar was decided before comparative negligence was adopted in
Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
41 130 W. Va. 466, 477, 43 S.E.2d 364, 370-71 (1947).
42 145 W. Va. 408, 417-18, 114 S.E.2d 913, 919 (1960).
" RFrATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 402A, Comment n (1965).
[Vol. 82
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It is apparent from reading the cases cited by the court in
Morningstar that the traditional form of contributory negligence,
defined as lack of due care for one's own safety as measured by the
objective man standard, is no defense.44 That is to say, conduct on
the part of the plaintiff which merely amounts to negligence would
not be a bar to recovery. For example, in a case cited by the court
it was held that the negligence of a driver in failing to take the best
action after discovering the defect, which was a stuck throttle that
prevented him from steering the vehicle, would not bar recovery.
The Texas court further held in the case that the defendant must
show that the plaintiff's voluntary exposure to risk was unreason-
able. 15
Contributory negligence is nearly always raised in mining
machine cases. The defense is based on the conduct of the operator
in his use of the machine. Since few manufacturers provide in-
struction booklets or other operating instructions for the machi-
nery, common sense must dictate the proper usage. For instance,
in Everly v. Lee Norse,4 the injured employee was placing a roof
bolt in the mine and had his arm ripped off at the elbow when he
placed his gloved hand on the bolt to hold it while it was being
inserted into the roof. The roof bolt manufacturer was sued be-
cause the roof bolt was rough, which caused the bolt to catch the
glove. The machine manufacturer was sued because the machine
failed to have dead man levers on the machine which could deacti-
vate it when the operator left the controls, as well as for the failure
to have a functionable guide to hold the roof bolt in place while it
was being inserted. The company which furnished the steel was
also sued for its failure to furnish steel without barbs on it. The
defense relied upon by each defendant was that the plaintiff was
negligent because he put his hand on the roof bolt as it was being
inserted. The defendants would have labelled the miner's conduct
assumption of the risk or possibly misuse of the product if the case
had arisen after Morningstar was decided. However, so long as the
workmen are using the product as it was intended to be used, and
in this instance those familiar with the products knew that men
" See Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 1ll. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). See
also Luque v. McLean; 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972);
Shields v. Morton Chemical Co., 95 Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974); Kirkland v.
General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
" Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1975).
46 No. CA 75-1046 (W.D. Pa. 14, 1977) (order dismissing suit with prejudice
following out of court settlement by the parties).
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often put their hands on the roof bolt, then a defense based on this
conduct is inappropriate unless venturesome conduct (true as-
sumption of the risk) is found.
In cases involving workmen using machinery, courts pre-
viously made an exception to the traditional principles of contribu-
tory negligence when the user of the machine, through inadvert-
ence or inattention, is injured." West Virginia also previously rec-
ognized that worker inattention would not bar recovery in Louis v.
Smith." The court stated in this case:
Nothing is more common and well known than a faithful
servant's mental absorption in his work to such an extent as to
render him at times partially oblivious to his surroundings. Adanger that must be kept constantly in mind necessitates a
division of the attention of the servant between his work and the
danger, and it is obviously difficult to maintain at all times."
In contrast to the traditional standards for contributory negli-
gence, the defense of assumption of risk has been defined by the
court as follows:
Assumption of risk is available as a defense only where one
places himself in a posture of known danger with an apprecia-
tion of such danger. . . proof of plaintiff's knowledge and viola-
tion are essential pre-conditions to successful invocation of the
assumption of risk defense. 0
This test is primarily a subjective test in the sense that the knowl-
edge, understanding and appreciation of the danger must be as-
sessed by the jury from the plaintiff's perspective, rather than by
measuring the plaintiff against the ordinary reasonable man. Thejury should consider all the facts established by the evidence, such
7 See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Co., 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972). The
plaintiff caught his hand in a punch press while attempting to adjust the metal to
be cut and at the same time pressed the foot pedal which set the cutting portion of
the machine in motion. The court held contributory negligence was not a defense.
Since the defendant was charged with the duty to install a safety device, it would
be anomalous to absolve it from liability where the injuries sustained would have
been prevented by the installation of the safety device. See also Luneau v. Elmwood
Gardens, 22 Misc. 2d 255, 198 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1960).
11 80 W. Va. 159, 92 S.E. 249 (1917).
11 Id. at 163, 92 S.E. at 251.
o Clements v. Stephens, 211 S.E.2d 110, 115 (W. Va. 1975) (citing Korzun v.
Shahan, 151 W.Va 243, 151 S.E.2d 287 (1966)). Clements involved a plaintiff who
was killed as a guest passenger in a car driven on the turnpike when the driver ran
off the road, apparently after he fell asleep at the wheel.
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as plaintiffs age, experience, knowledge, and understanding as
well as the obvious nature of the defect and the degree of danger
it poses.'
With the recent adoption of comparative negligence12 the
question naturally arises whether or not this principle will apply
to actions founded on strict liability and, just as naturally, the
answer seems to be no. Since the purpose of strict liability is to
impose liability for a defective product upon the person who placed
it into the stream of commerce, the emphasis is shifted away from
the conduct of the user. 3 Logic would then dictate that since con-
tributory negligence is not a defense, comparative negligence,
which also depends upon the negligent conduct of the plaintiff,
would not be a defense.14 However, California, the mother of West
Virginia products liability cases, when presented with this ques-
tion, held that comparative fault would apply in all future strict
tort liability cases. The California court declared that:
Plaintiffs will continue to be relieved of proving that the manu-
facturer or distributor was negligent in the production, design
or dissemination of the article in question. Defendants' liability
for injuries caused by a defective product remains strict. The
principle of protecting the defenseless is likewise preserved, for
plaintiff's recovery will be reduced only to the extent that his
own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury. The cost
of compensating the victim of a defective product, albeit pro-
portionately reduced, remains on defendant manufacturer, and
will through him, be 'spread among society.',"
It becomes difficult to predict whether West Virginia will fol-
low the more natural course of disallowing comparative negligence
or will follow the historical leader. Since other courts presented
with the question have had difficulty following what would seem
SI Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 IIl. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
52 Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co., 256 S.E.2d 879 (W. Va. 1979).
Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976); See also 2
FRUMER & FREDmA, supra note 22, § 16A[5][g].
54 Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976)(applying Nebraska
law); Kinard v. Coats Co., 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835 (1976).
11 Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978).
51 Id. at 736-37, 575 P.2d 1162, 1168-69, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 386-87 (1978). It
appears that assumption of the risk is not a complete bar to recovery with this
interpretation. See 2 FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, § 16A[5l[g].
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to be the logical choice,57 which is not applying comparative negli-
gence, West Virginia will likely follow California's position and
adopt comparative fault in strict liability cases.
V. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In the development of strict liability, there has been confusion
in many jurisdictions with regard to the appropriate statute of
limitation." Because strict liability is a claim for personal injuries,
the tort statute of limitations seems applicable. However, the his-
torical warranty background caused some jurisdictions to conclude
that the applicable statute was that of contract - four years from
the time the product is sold."
The West Virginia statute of limitation for personal injuries
is two years." This applies to actions for personal injuries regard-
less of whether they sound in tort or contract.' The statute begins
to run from the date of the injury," or the date the plaintiff learns
of, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have learned
of, the injury or damage." The issue of when the plaintiff knew or
should have become aware of his injury or damage is for the jury
to determine.64 Although the question was not addressed in
57 Two jurisdictions have applied comparative negligence by court decision:
Pan Alaska Fisheries, Inc. v. Marine Constr. & Design Co., 564 F.2d 1129 (9th Cir.
1977) (applying Washington law); Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods,
555 P.2d 42 (Alaska 1976). Two states have applied the doctrine by statute:
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1979 West Supp.); NEB. Iv. STAT. § 25-1151.
1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, § 16A[5][h]. See also 75 W. VA. L.
Rsv. 201 (1972).
51 Rempe v. General Elec. Co., 28 Conn. Supp. 160, 254 A.2d 577 (1969); Gardi-
ner v. Philadelphia Gas Works, 413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1965). The Uniform
Commercial Code as adopted in West Virginia provides for a four year period of
limitation in warranty actions, W. VA. CODE § 46-2-725. The cause of action accrues
when a breach occurs (which is when tender of delivery is made unless the warranty
explicitly extends to future performance of the goods), regardless of the lack of
knowledge of the breach.
0 W. VA. CODE § 55-2-12 provides: "Every personal action for which no limita-
tion is otherwise prescribed shall be brought . . . (b) within two years next after
the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal
injuries."
e, Maynard v. General Electric Co., 486 F.2d 538 (4th Cir. 1973).
'2 Bock & Davis Co. v. Charleston Nat'l Bank, 443 F. Supp. 1175 (S.D.W. Va.
1977); Howard v. United Fuel Gas Co., 248 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.W. Va. 1965).
Family Savings & Loan, Inc. v. Ciccarello, 207 S.E.2d 157 (W. Va. 1974);
Morgan v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 149 W. Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156 (1965).
61 Hill v. Clarke, 241 S.E.2d 572 (W. Va. 1978).
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Morningstar, it seems obvious that, in strict liability cases, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals would adhere to past
principles and adopt the position that the two year personal injury
statute applies from the time of the injury or when the injury
should have been discovered.
The view to be adopted in West Virginia has grave implica-
tions for mining machinery cases as well as all other products
liability cases, since in many instances the injury does not occur
until many years after the product is in service. To extinguish the
cause of action before it arises by adhering to a statute of limita-
tions based on the sale date of the product ignores current legal
development.
Finally, the proper statute of limitations to be applied is a real
problem because many miners as well as other workers do not
realize they may have a claim against the manufacturer of a ma-
chine because of its design, lack of safety features or malfunction.
Inquiry is often made initially at an attorney's office only because
workmen's compensation benefits are ceasing. Many solo practi-
tioners and small firms who have daily contacts with miners and
workmen need to be alert to the possibility of the products liability
action as a remedy for the injured client. Additionally, the union
could do more to educate the miners on availability of such a
remedy. 5
VI. ADMISSmILrrY OF CHANGES IN THE PRODUCT
West Virginia has recognized the general rule that evidence of
precaution or changes after an accident or incident is not admissi-
ble to prove antecedent negligence.66 However, there have been
many exceptions made to this rule which will allow the introduc-
tion of such evidence." The West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals has recognized some of the exceptions to this general rule and
has allowed the evidence to be admitted when necessary to explain
to the jury which saw, on a view to the scene of the accident, a
different situatiol' than what existed at the time the accident oc-
'5 See, e.g., Early, Workers Compensation - Adding Insult to Injury, 15 UMW
JouRNAL 16 (1975).
66 Mabe v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 145 W. Va. 718, 116 S.E.2d 874
(1960).
'7 Two excellent sources for ideas and cases in this area are: 1 FRUMER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, §§ 12.04, 16.03[4][b][ii], 16A[4]Lj]; Annot., 74
A.L.R.3d 1001 (1976).
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curred.18 The court also has ruled such evidence admissible to
allow the plaintiff to explain the changes which had been made in
a grade crossing after the defendant contended that no changes or
only slight changes had been made. 9 In one case, the court refused
to expand the rule and admit evidence which would have estab-
lished that part of a product had been removed from the market
immediately after a person had been injured. 0
Other jurisdictions have allowed evidence of subsequent
changes in the product to be admitted in many situations. One of
the most compelling reasons in product liability cases to allow such
evidence is that it demonstrates the feasibility or practicality of
the modification which would have prevented the accident or
would have made the plaintiff aware of the hazard.7
Another important exception to the rule in actions against the
manufacturer is the admission of evidence of changes in the prod-
uct made by others. 2 This becomes important in coal mine machi-
nery cases as well as other industrial product liability cases be-
cause the products are frequently modified by the employer or
sometimes by the workmen themselves, and in many instances
these changes make the machinery safer. 3 It is certainly not an
Redman v. Community Hotel Corp., 138 W. Va. 456, 76 S.E.2d 759 (1953).
Steel supports, which would have prevented the tilting of the boiler which caused
the accident, had been installed subsequent to the accident and were present when
the jury viewed the premises.
e' Weaver v. Wheeling Traction Co., 91 W. Va. 528, 114 S.E. 131 (1922).
70 Rutherford v. Huntington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 142 W. Va. 681, 97 S.E.2d
803 (1957). The court reversed because of error in admitting evidence that the
remaining soft drinks were removed from the machine immediately after plaintiff
ingested glass which was in a soft drink purchased from the machine.
71 See, e.g., Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206 (1971) (evidence of
warning placed in literature subsequent to accident admissible); Stark v. Allis-
Chalmers & Northwest Roads, Inc., 2 Wash. App. 399, 467 P.2d 854 (1970) (evi-
dence of panic bar on a tractor admissible to show feasibility).
72 See, e.g., Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741 (7th Cir. 1974) (Metal clips
which held a mine cable to the roof failed, killing the plaintiff's decedent; evidence
could be admitted that a workman later tied the cable to the roof with polyprene
rope.); Steele v. Wiedmann Machine Co., 280 F.2d 380 (3d Cir. 1960) (The defen-
dant successfully proved that the employer had attempted to correct a safety device
on a punch press.); Denolf v. Frank L. Jursik Co., 395 Mich. 661, 238 N.W.2d 1
(1976) (Evidence could be admitted that the employer installed a guard which
would have prevented the employee from crushing his hand on a machine designed
and installed by defendant.).
73 Of course, if the alteration by an employer or workman occurred in the
product before the accident and this alteration was the proximate cause of the
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admission of negligence by the manufacturer when someone else
makes changes in the design of their product, and this evidence
should be admitted to prove feasibility.
In Everley v. Lee Norse,74 a coal mine operator whose em-
ployee was injured by a roof bolter, designed and installed a device
which hydraulically held the roof bolt while it was being inserted
into the roof. The employee lost the hand he was using to steady
the roof bolt while it was being inserted. The device that the mine
owner designed would have prevented the accident. Certainly, evi-
dence of this kind would be useful to a jury trying to determine
whether the manufacturer could have placed such a device or a
similar safety device on the machine.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have incorporated the general
rule for use in federal courts. 5 Remedial measures, while inadmis-
sible to prove negligence, are admissible to show control, owner-
ship or feasibility."
However, it has been recently held that the rule is different
in strict liability cases and that post-accident remedial measures
are admissible. Courts are now ruling that in strict liability cases
the "public policy" assumptions justifying this evidentiary rule are
no longer valid.7
With the many exceptions to the rule already widely recog-
nized and the recent adoption of strict liability across the nation,
injuries, the manufacturer would not be liable under the current state of the law.
See, Annot., 41 A.L.R.3d 1251 (1972). It might be successfully argued, under a
negligence theory of recovery, that if the user modified the product in a manner
which should have been foreseen by the manufacturer and no warning was given
against the type of modification, then liability would attach.
1' No. CA 75-1046 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 14, 1977) (order dismissing suit with preju-
dice following out of court settlement by the parties).
11 When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken pre-
viously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the
subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable
conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the
exclusions of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precaution-
ary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.
FED. R. EVID. 407.
76 Id.
" Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975). See Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 Ill. App. 3d 313, 281 N.E.2d
749 (1972); Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 86 Nev. 408, 470 P.2d 135 (1970).
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it is anticipated that this rule of admissibility of remedial changes
will become widely adopted78 and will be accepted in West Virginia
when the opportunity is presented. At the very least, many of the
exceptions recognized by other jurisdictions should be incorpo-
rated into our products liability law.
VII. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in the law of products liability amount
to a near revolution. The decisions in many recent West Virginia
cases, as well as currently developing case law in the nation, make
it imperative that the local practitioner take a fresh approach in
advising his client. The lawyer in West Virginia whose clientele
includes numerous coal miners must be particularly alert. The
responsible practitioner will recognize the laxness in the mining
machine industry79 as an opportunity to obtain compensation for
his client as well as a chance to improve the safety of all miners.
That litigation of this type will contribute to the overall safety
in the mines has been demonstrated in other industries. Studies
show that manufacturers become increasingly safety conscious as
the number of products liability claims rise. 0
With the adoption of strict liability in West Virginia, the coal
miners, as well as other persons injured as the result of a defective
product, will have their interests protected in a manner which fits
the way in which we presently live and work. The means are now
at hand for the skilled trial lawyer to correct the deficiencies of the
past.
78 Merritt, Ault v. International Harvester Co. - Death Knell to the Exclu-
sionary Rule Against Subsequent Remedial Conduct in Strict Product Liability, 13
SAN DINGo L. REv. 208 (1975).
11 Public Hearings on Section 317(J), supra note 2, at 69 (statement of H.
Potter). An operating company spokesman even expected the government to shoul-
der the burden for the miner's safety, "Give us time, show us how it shall be done,
how it can be done, and we will do it." Id. at 80 (statement of E. Webb, Safety
Director, Eastern Associated Coal).
10 A recent Department of Commerce study concluded that product liability
litigation was not only making manufacturers obtain insurance against such occurr-
ences, but has a very positive effect on causing them to devote more time to product
liability prevention, such as improved quality control, improved labeling and prod-
uct redesign. U.S. DEPARTrr OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCy TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT
LiAamY: FiNAL REPoirr (1977); 5 FRuMER_ & FRIEDMAN, supra note 22, app. 1009-13
(1977).
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